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Abstract. Codes and passwords are the bane of user experiences: even
small mistakes can delay desired activities, causing undue frustration.
Work on codes has focused on security instead of people’s ability to
enter them error-free. Difficulties observed in a security demonstration
motivated this investigation of code transcription difficulty. A pilot study
with 33 subjects and a follow-up study with 267 subjects from 24 coun-
tries measured performance and preference for codes of varying lengths,
patterns, and character sets.
We found that, for users of all languages, long codes with alternating
consonant - vowel patterns were more accurately transcribed and are
preferred over shorter numeric or alphabetic codes. Mixed-case and al-
phanumeric character sets both increased transcription errors.
The proposed CVC6 code design composed of six Consonant-Vowel-
Consonant trigrams is faster to enter, more secure, preferred by users,
and more impervious to user error when compared to codes typically
used for security purposes. An extension integrates error detection and
correction, essentially eliminating typos.
Keywords: Usable-security; Error correcting codes; Authentication; User
study
1 Introduction
People all have different codes for their driver’s license, social security, govern-
ment ID, and bank accounts, and passwords to access email, social media, and
each online transaction or community system they use. These codes are now cen-
tral to protecting our identities. Passwords are codes used in conjunction with
logins to authenticate users.
The most frequent answer to our increasing security needs [17, 31] has been
to add more passwords, increase length and character complexity with upper-
and lower-case characters and special characters [8], and change them frequently,
counter-productively making them even harder to remember [10].
Biometrics have been considered a candidate solution to those problems for
a long time, but finger prints, iris detection, and face recognition systems have
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all been shown to be hackable [22, 27, 9]. Passwords have the advantage of being
pure information, hence easier to create and share with a trusted party, but they
have become an arms race with no predictable outcome [21].
We are required to come up with and/or enter codes with a variety of pat-
terns, from copying credit card numbers to Wi-Fi codes to account passwords.
Much progress has been presented on usable security, to study the perception
of complexity and counter the failures of user-created passwords [24, 30, 29, 13].
Jeff Yan’s paper [32] was an important first exploration into password memora-
bility. It showed that mnemonics can help memorability of passwords [3] while
not compromising security strength, leading to additional work in that direction
[26, 18, 14, 20].
But how well do people succeed when using codes and how can their suc-
cess be improved? We all enter codes many times a day, typing our name and
well-practised passwords much faster than new character strings (especially au-
tomatically generated ones). Many of us forget or mis-enter codes while needing
to get access to our resources [7].
Creating codes adapted to their use, whether it is memorability, ease of entry,
or speed can greatly reduce stress and breakage in everyone’s work. Trade-offs
are inherent in privacy and security [1], and a single compromised password can
be catastrophic [15]. Typical systems might require people to use at least 8 char-
acters, upper- and lower-case, numbers, and special characters, although some
have started questioning if people gain actual security with the added complex-
ity [11, 10]. In one illustrative example, frustration and confusion with character
recognition in a code-based voting system caused at least 10% additional ab-
stention [5].
User-created codes versus single-use or automatically generated codes present
very different challenges for usability. Automatically-generated codes depend on
multiple frequent assumptions that haven’t been extensively questioned. Does
increased character set complexity [25] make better codes? Does separation of a
code into multiple fragments (in this paper called ’chunking’ a code) with spaces
in between reduce errors? Are nonsense patterns of alphanumerics for security
better than syllabic codes or even words? This paper tests usability and security
together for codes that are not user-created.
Are there trade-offs between length, character sets and structural patterns
that can improve people’s ability to use codes? How do these trade-offs change
when considering the ability to reduce transcription errors for one-time codes?
Can techniques for making codes easier to enter work across cultures or even
languages?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After presenting the main
results, we introduce the experimental protocol for the two crowd-sourced tests
of usability and transcribability via a web-based approach. Experimental Results
presents data from the pilot and main experiments, showing links between length
and type of code trade-offs. The implications of these findings are developed.
Inspired by the results, the paper then introduces CVC6 , a 6-trigram code design
for higher-entropy higher-usability codes always composed of 6 consonant-vowel-
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consonant trigrams. An extension of CVC6 is also presented that includes error
detection/correction, CVC6++ . The paper concludes by showing how more work
could be done to further explore the design of cross-cultural, easy-to-transcribe,
high-entropy codes everyone finds themselves using several times a day.
1.1 Definitions
The experiments included randomly-generated codes composed of sequences of
the following type:
– numeric: numbers from 0 to 9.
– alphabetic: lower-case Latin letters (excluding diacritics).
– alphanumeric: numbers, lower-case, and upper-case alphabetic characters,
containing at least one of each.
– CVCs: consonant-vowel-consonant alphabetic trigrams in lower-case. Vowels
are a, i, e, o, u and y. Consonants go from b to z, excluding y as well as q
due to demonstrated discrimination problems between y, q and g.
2 Main Results
This paper has 4 main experimental observations, and one theoretical contribu-
tion.
– Transcribing codes takes concentration and is highly dependent on the code’s
structure. This work found that, for a given length, code structure can reduce
transcription error rates from 16.9% to 1.9%.
– A majority of code transcription errors can be eliminated by using a set
of unambiguous alphabetic characters (excluding visually ambiguous g/q/y
and i/l, which were already known to be error prone [12]), eliminating mixed
case to prevent upper-case/lower-case confusions, and eliminating numbers.
– The relationship between code length and time needed to enter it strongly
depends on the code’s structure; spaces can help for long alphanumeric codes
but can be confusing for others. Using a consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC)
pattern in codes can reduce time to transcribe even with codes twice as long.
– People have a 75% chance of recognising a code they had seen 2 to 5 minutes
earlier. However, they will correctly reject a novel code they haven’t seen in
87% of cases.
Based on these findings, the protocol, CVC6 is proposed that is easier and faster
to transcribe, with fewer mistakes and increased security. We also introduce
CVC6++ , an extension that includes error detection and correction.
3 Experiment Design
The following experiments have the goal of demonstrating trade-offs between
character sets, number of characters, and patterns of characters to create easy-
to-enter secure codes. A web-based interface was developed in Javascript to se-
quentially present discrete code transcription problems. It was iteratively tested
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in a pilot experiment and then improved and extended for a main experiment.
The goal was to have people type codes in the kinds of places they typically are
when using online services. To understand how codes can be improved in the
wild, experiments were conducted wherever a person was (real-life conditions,
not a laboratory environment). Our analyses generally avoid raw averages and
focus on trimmed averages and medians to eliminate anomalies (such as one
participant taking close to 5 hours to answer a single question).
3.1 Pilot Experiment
A protocol was developed that would take no more than a few minutes and test
transcription of code length, character sets, and spaces. Engagement was initially
solicited personally by a docent from 33 random attendants of the science fiction
conference Worldcon 75 in August 2017 for a pilot experiment. The initial design
did not adequately distinguish capitalisation problems and issues around the way
input is entered on smart phones. Unfortunately it also didn’t correctly disable
auto-correct. Despite those setbacks, the data still showed that codes following
syllabic patterns had many advantages and laid the groundwork for changes to
put into the experiment.
While several of the pilot experiment’s results were statistically significant,
the main experiment corroborates and extends these on a larger and more diverse
sample. The pilot helped validate and improve the Javascript protocol and show
where more data was needed. Results below detail only the main experiment
(data will be available for both studies in a public online repository).
Fig. 1. Screenshots from the experiment’s interface
3.2 General Protocol
Participants were individuals that responded to an opportunity to volunteer
online. They were told that they could quit the experiment at any time. Their
data was only collected (through FormSpree) if they confirmed submission at
the end. The total time taken generally varied from 3 to 10 minutes.
For security as well as privacy, all code executed was on the user’s device and
visible to the user, and only recorded their final answers and timestamps.
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The study was presented as a sequence of web forms with an introduction and
three main sections, designed to measure transcription performance, preferences
between different kinds of codes, and ability to remember the codes shown in
the first section.
Sections
– Welcome and basic participant information
– Transcription: Nine codes of different length to transcribe into a prompt
– Choice: Nine pairs of codes varying from 9 to 22 characters in length and
type (alphabetic, alphanumeric, and Consonant-Vowel-Consonant (CVC))
where the participant was asked to choose and transcribe the easiest.
– Memory: Participants were presented with seven codes and asked if they
had seen this code earlier. They were also asked to give an estimate of the
number of codes they had transcribed.
– Accept: Participants were asked to upload their answers and given the choice
of adding their email to be kept informed.
Introduction and Basic Information The welcome page presented the ex-
periment as an opportunity to help research, and informed participants that they
could leave at any time. It took care not to prime them with research goals. It
asked their age, country, main language used, self-rating of their ability to re-
member passwords and strings of numbers/letters, as well as whether they were
using a mobile device or a numeric keypad in the experiment. Optionally, partic-
ipants could submit their email to receive the experiment results once published.
Those emails were stored securely and separately from the data that was anal-
ysed. Participants were not asked their gender or other personal characteristics
as they were not pertinent to the research.
Transcription The codes were grouped by length (9, 12, and 15 characters),
each group presenting three types of code trials in the following order: numeric,
CVC, and alphanumeric. This gave a baseline error rate from which to replicate
standard findings [12, 16] such as the prevalence of the g/q/y error. It also gave
rates for other types of errors, allowing the comparison of different code struc-
tures. Participants were not informed of errors they had committed and had a
single try for each code.
Choice Each trial included choosing to type in a 10 alphanumeric control code
or a second code. The codes were grouped by character sets used – 3 using
numeric, 3 CVCs, and finally 3 alphabetic. Trials were given in order of increasing
length for each type.
Memory Every question included a code participants had seen earlier, or a
randomly generated code of the same type and length, with probability 0.5 for
each. The types were numeric of length 9, and CVCs and alphanumeric of length
9, 12, and 15.
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Randomisation A between-subjects approach was used to observe priming and
learning. Half the participants did the Choice section first, and the other half
started with the Transcription. Half the participants also received the Transcrip-
tion questions in reversed order.
For the Choice section, the order in which the two codes were presented was
also randomised to avoid preference for the one on the left or right. The 9 codes
in the Choice section were presented in order of increasing length. The pilot
experiment seemed to indicate a tipping point close to 18, so we bracketed by
testing codes of length going from 15 to 22. As this phase was already the most
time-consuming for the participant, having one code for each length would have
made the experiment too long. Hence, it was broken up in A/B testing giving
participants two codes of length respectively 15 and 20, and one of random length
between 16 and 22.
Times Time taken was measured for each question, as well as the time spent
reading the different sets of instructions. As the protocol was self-administered
and self-paced, some people took breaks, ranging from a few minutes to five
hours. Large delays on a single question were observed in around 15% of re-
spondents. Taking breaks or getting distracted is part of life; long breaks alone
did not disqualify all trials from analysis. Data for each question was indepen-
dently evaluated and the abnormally short and abnormally long responses were
removed (top and bottom 10%). Medians were consistently 5 − 10% under the
trimmed averages and are not shown as they lead to the same conclusions.
Chunking The Transcription section codes were split into ”chunks” of 3, 4, or
5 characters followed by a space. In the Choice section, chunks of 3 were used.
For lengths not divisible by 3, the last chunk had between 2 and 4 characters,
and the 10-character alphanumeric codes avoided a 1-character last chunk by
using a 4-character central chunk.
3.3 Demographics
The main experiment included 267 respondents, with some skipping a few ques-
tions4. Participants were solicited for the main experiment using three methods,
creating three groups. The web links followed to get to the experiment identified
which group a participant was in. The first group was international in scope,
spread through Facebook and totalled 61 respondents.
The second was mostly French, using a translated form, and was composed
in majority of software developers, as it was spread through a French computer
engineering school’s social network and Internet Relay Chat, with 91 respon-
dents. Members of this group were highly tech-savvy compared to the other two
groups (due to how they were recruited).
4 This accounts for less than 3% of questions and is generally caused by a double-click
on the ”next” button, as timestamps show the participants spending a few hundred
milliseconds on a page.
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The third was overwhelmingly composed of people from the USA, with 115
respondents recruited through a website indexing psychological and social experi-
ments often used by college students (http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html).
All three groups included a wide range of ages, with the youngest being
19 years old for the pilot and 13 for the main experiment5. The eldest were
respectively 70 and 73 years old, with most participants between 18 and 32.
People from 24 different countries and speaking 14 languages participated,
including a few who were used to scripts written from right to left. English was
the most frequent language indicated (129 people), with French second (114
people), and 34 participants indicating other main languages.
The goal in this recruitment method was to avoid having anomalies coming
from a bias stemming from a single recruitment process. The results shown are
only the ones that are consistent among all groups.
4 Main Experimental Data
4.1 Error Typology
The first section acted as a control to get a transcribing performance baseline,
and allowed different patterns in transcribing behaviour to be observed. The
following Figure 3 shows the different error types observed in both sections –
which differ as the text to transcribe varies. Underneath are the definitions for
the error types.
– Missing/added char : a single character is either missing or was duplicated,
which changes the length of the code.
– Similarity : confusion due to the similar shape of two characters, most com-
monly where one writes 0 instead of O, g instead of q or y (mostly present
in the pilot), or confuses I with l and 1.
– Transposition: the order of two characters was reversed.
– Adjacent key : a key next to the target was hit, such as g instead of h. This
mostly happens with horizontally adjacent keys.
– Capitalisation: an upper-case letter is written in lower-case, or vice-versa –
this nearly only happens with alphanumeric codes.
– Autocorrect : despite our disabling of autocorrect via JavaScript, 2% of partic-
ipants showed repeated revealing mistakes where whole words were changed.
4.2 Transcription Trial
Figure 4 shows the error rates for each code (structure/length) couple, for each
group. Figure 5 shows the time taken (trimmed average) for those.
5 The three participants who were younger than 16 all came through the psychological
study website
Consonant-Vowel-Consonants for Error-Free Code Entry 9
27.5%
22.8%22.2%
13.2%
4.8%
1.1%
8.5%
Transcription
Missing/added char
Similarity
Transposition
Adjacent key
Capitalization
Autocorrect
Other
28.4%
23.5%17.6%
9.2%
4.9%
2.6%
13.7%
Choice
Fig. 3. Proportion of error types in each trial
0 5 10 15 20
Error rate (%)
9
12
15
Co
de
 le
ng
th
CVC (all groups)
Numeric (all groups)
Alphanumeric (all groups)
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Fig. 4. Error rate, by code type and length
10 Nikola K. Blanchard, Leila Gabasova, Ted Selker
0 5 10 15 20
Time taken (s)
9
12
15
Co
de
 le
ng
th
CVC (all groups)
Numeric (all groups)
Alphanumeric (all groups)
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Fig. 5. Time taken to transcribe, by code type and length
4.3 Choice Trial
Figure 6 shows the proportion of people who chose to transcribe different code
structures of varying lengths over a 10-character alphanumeric string.
Figure 7 shows the time taken for each structure by length, and the average
time taken by the people who chose the 10-character alphanumeric.
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Fig. 6. Percentage of participants preferring alternative codes to 10-character alphanu-
meric ones, by code type and length
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4.4 Strategies
Many people appeared to follow a strategy to choose which code to transcribe.
Across 267 participants we identified 121 different patterns, of which here are
the 5 most common ones (accounting for more than a third of participants):
– 31 people always chose the alphanumeric.
– 24 people chose the alphanumeric for all cases but one (either short or mid-
length CVCs or numeric).
– 18 people only chose the alphanumeric against numeric codes.
– 12 people only chose the alphanumeric in one case.
– 11 people never chose the alphanumeric.
4.5 Memory
The ability to recognise codes that people had seen once in the past few minutes
was 75%. People were also good at discarding codes they had not previously
seen, with 87% success rate. This converts to a false negative rate of 25%, and
false positive rate of 13%. The following table shows the error rate for each type
of memory question:
NUM9 CVC9 CVC12 CVC15 ANUM9 ANUM12 ANUM15
22.5 28.8 8.6 14.4 29.2 12.0 16.7
The answer to the question asking them to estimate the number of codes
they had written was relatively precise when we look at the trimmed average
(18.7 for a true value of 18), but not with a simple average or a median (both
at 20.0− 20.1), because of a large variance, a strong tendency to write 20 (more
than a quarter of participants) and the 8% of people who overestimated by a
factor between 2 and 6.
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5 Analysis
Here are the main effects observed:
– CVC codes were less error-prone than alphanumeric ones for all lengths
(p < 0.005).
– Participants preferred CVCs of length at most 20 over 10-character alphanu-
meric codes, with rates varying between 72% and 48% in the worst case
(p < 10−4).
– 10-character alphanumeric codes were preferred to alphabetic and numeric
codes of lengths greater than 19 (p < 10−4). Only 7.4% chose the alphabetic
code of length 22 over the alphanumeric alternative. They were preferred or
equivalent for shorter lengths (with at most 53% choosing alphabetic codes
over alphanumeric ones).
– For each length, CVCs were faster to type than numeric. Those were in
turn faster to type than alphanumeric (p < 0.05 to p < 10−4 depending
on the couple). The speed increased by up to 59% for CVCs as opposed to
alphanumeric.
– When presented with chunked codes (with spaces between groups of charac-
ters), 91% of participants wrote the spaces in the codes they typed.
– Chunked codes were faster to enter (p < 0.015) by an average of 8% (with a
maximum of 14%).
– Chunking in three-character groups only statistically lowered the error rate
for alphanumeric codes (p = 0.033).
– People were better at rejecting codes they hadn’t seen than at confirming
that they’d seen a specific code, (p < 10−4, the false negative rate was more
than twice the false positive rate).
– The typing speed and the error rate were not statistically correlated (both
when considered by participant and by individual code).
Other significant effects presented themselves as well:
– There was no statistically significant difference on error rates between nu-
meric and CVC codes.
– A great variability in typing speed was observed, with 20% of people typing
above 1.34 characters per second, and 20% typing below 0.75 c/s (within the
normal bounds for non-professional typists [19]). The top 5% entered codes
more than three times faster than the bottom 5%.
– Recognition ability was correlated with self-rating in the memory section.
Two cohesive clusters appeared, one around 28% error rate for people who
rated their memory 1 or 2, and one between 16% and 18% for those who
rated it higher (p < 10−4).
– A learning effect was observed (p < 10−4), with people reaching up to 18%
higher speeds by the time they finished the transcription section. A/B testing
compensated for this, making its effects negligible in other results.
– There was a recognition peak around length 12 for both CVCs and alphanu-
meric codes, strongly reducing both false positive and false negative rates
(p < 10−4).
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6 Discussion
Pronounceable codes such as CVC are faster to type and more accurate than
random alphanumeric ones. The crucial point is that the magnitude of the effect
is such that it renders longer codes a viable alternative, even in contexts where
security is the objective.
11 of the 31 errors present in the transcription phase of CVC were preventable
by checking the length. An additional 4 could be automatically fixed by checking
whether the letter typed was a vowel or a consonant. Among the 106 errors found
in alphanumeric codes, only 7 were preventable in such ways. This motivated
the development of CVC6 below.
Chunking the codes in groups of 3 characters only reduced errors for al-
phanumeric codes (numeric codes seemed to benefit from chunking, although
not enough for statistical significance). This might be explained from people’s
instinctive chunking of CVCs even without spaces. There was some confusion on
whether to add the spaces between the chunks, but despite this and the added
characters, the speed still improved overall for all codes.
Directly analysing error rates and speeds is difficult in the Choice section
as they depended on the participants’ strategies. Depending on the choice they
faced, the average time taken by people who chose the alphanumeric code varied
between 13.5 and 20.8 seconds. Presenting them with long numeric codes did
slow them by up to 7 seconds, even for the people who ignored those long codes.
Memory was strongly influenced by length. The structure of the code did not
visibly affect its memorability. Simple considerations of ability to discern two
codes and memorability of long codes seem insufficient to explain a recognition
peak at length 12 as they should differently affect false positive and false negative
rates. When asked to estimate the number of questions, there was a tendency to
answer with multiples of 5, in 76% of participants.
The three groups, with their different demographics and methods of recruit-
ment, showed some variations in their performances. However, all the effects
mentioned so far are observed not only in the general data, but also within each
group, increasing their ecological validity as they do not depend on recruitment
peculiarities. The most salient difference was that group 2 took more time but
made fewer errors than the other groups. This could come from a variety of things
such as their supposedly higher technical expertise (being mostly computer engi-
neering students) or different keyboard layouts. The effect is also observed when
we cluster by language (although the overlap is big between those two clustering
methods).
These results suggested a code format that improves usability as well as
security for most purposes, presented below.
7 CVC6
The goal was to design a code that is easier and faster to enter, as well as
more secure. CVC6 codes are composed of 6 CVC trigrams, as in the following
14 Nikola K. Blanchard, Leila Gabasova, Ted Selker
example:
cab dij kap pod myn ret
7.1 Advantages
From a security standpoint (for use as passwords), CVC6 has high entropy, with
1.03×1020 total possibilities, or 66.5 bits of entropy. This is following Kerckhoff’s
principle with the adversary knowing the format of the code used (against a blind
brute-force, it would instead correspond to 2.95 × 1025 possibilities or 86 bits).
Current standards for passwords are between 8 and 10-character alphanumeric
codes, which are not necessarily randomly generated. Those have at most 48 and
59.5 bits of entropy, meaning that CVC6 takes at least 100 times more effort to
brute-force, assuming the adversary already knows which system is used.
Nearly two thirds (66%) of the study’s participants perceived CVC6 as easier
than both equivalent alphanumeric and alphabetic codes.
Despite its length, CVC6 is faster to type than other codes of similar or lower
entropy. In the Choice section, CVC codes demonstrated average and median
speeds higher by 10% to 80% compared to equivalent code structures. This is
despite entropies being as low as 59.5 bits for alphanumeric and 50 bits for
numeric (the trade-off meaning that a lower entropy generally implies a faster
typing speed).
The error rate is already more than a third lower in CVCs than in comparable
codes, but this can be improved even further. CVC6 can get under 5% error by
eliminating the following sources of error:
– Capitalisation errors, as the code isn’t case-sensitive
– Symbol confusions, which would almost entirely disappear, leaving only v/w
(which is very rare)
– Thanks to the alternating consonant and vowel pattern, character deletion
and transposition would be immediately detectable by the system and visible
to the user. This would also apply to10% of near misses.
This can be additionally improved by handling error correction, shown below
with the improved CVC6++ approach.
8 CVC6++
Getting an error when typing in a code frustrates most users, and not being able
to find its location even drives some to abandon whatever task was at hand.
One improvement of considerable value would then be for the system to de-
tect an error and point it out, possibly indicating what the error was. This would
eliminate mistakes CVC6 is vulnerable to (mostly near misses and phonetically
similar characters). It would have eliminated all of the 495 errors in this paper’s
experiments. Only double or triple errors wouldn’t be corrected, and the three
double errors observed in the transcribed CVC codes would have been detected
correctly. Error detection, localisation, and/or correction would reduce user con-
fusion and input time. A natural extension to CVC6 achieves all of those.
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8.1 Protocol
The extended error detection/correction protocol is shown on Figure 8 and works
as follows:
– To add correction without compromising on entropy, one last chunk ”YZ”
of two consonants after the last trigram is added to the code.
– To detect, localise, and correct the error:
• Values from 1 to 19 are assigned to each consonant: b = 1, c = 2, d =
3 etc. Since consonants and vowels are not used in the same position,
numbers can be reused by vowels: a = 1, e = 2, i = 3, o = 4, u = 5.
• Y is computed by summing all the values modulo 19.
• Z is computed by summing all the values, multiplied by their position in
the code, modulo 19.
Suppose that there is an error concerning a single character in position i ≤ 18
(i.e. the error is not on Y or Z). If the value of the entered Y differs from the
sum computed from the input, the error is detected. d× i mod 19 is the differ-
ence between the computed Z and the Z’ entered with an error. The difference d
between the character entered and the correct one is also calculated. The com-
bination of those two directly shows the unique possibility for a single-character
error. This is where having a base 19 system is crucial, as only prime bases allow
this (as the multiplication modulo 19 is bijective). In the case where the single
error concerns Y or Z, the other one is correct, which cannot happen in normal
cases, so the system knows that the error concerns either Y or Z (and can ignore
it).
Fig. 8. Error correction in CVC6++
8.2 Advantages and Limitations
The obvious advantage of CVC6++ is that it allows the system to automatically
identify/correct the code and avoid wasting the time of a frustrated user. This
automatic correction should not be used where correcting a double error into a
different code would be strongly detrimental, such as voting. Instead, the system
could indicate the location of the error to the user, to allow them to quickly check
and correct it themselves.
16 Nikola K. Blanchard, Leila Gabasova, Ted Selker
The second advantage lies in its use in conjunction with cryptographic elec-
tronic voting, where one person can vote by proxy by giving a code to a trusted
third party. This third party does not have access to the list of valid codes
and would normally have no way to notice if something went wrong during
the transmission of the code. As they have an obligation to make a selection,
the only solution to an error would be a system that would allow them to
quickly detect this error. A public website checking valid CVC6++ is available
at www.koliaza.com/CVC.
The main limitation of CVC6++ is that it cannot work as naturally for CVCs
longer than 6 trigrams, as multiple conflicting correction possibilities would ap-
pear. Probabilistic error correction could solve this, or an extension of the last
two letters to a larger character-set.
Its length (for the same level of security) would also make it less popular
than CVC6 , although a majority in our experiments would still prefer it to
alphanumeric codes.
9 Conclusion
This paper explores how transcription of codes such as passwords can be affected
by length, character sets, and structure. Results come from an experiment in-
volving 267 subjects from 24 countries. The online experiments showed how large
improvements to speed, transcription, and memorability can be made without
compromising security for usable codes.
The value of generating passwords in general is discussed in the introduction
but the original motivation behind this paper came from problems in electronic
voting experiments which use automatically generated passwords. The results of
this work are already helping in the ongoing voting technology experiments.
Discrete transcription trials showed that, as they are often found in words,
codes based on CVC trigrams are preferred, faster, and less error-prone than
alphanumeric, alphabetic, or numeric codes.
Most errors came from a few easily identifiable factors. Ambiguous shapes
such as 0 and O, g, y and q, or l, i and 1 account for more than a quarter of errors.
Along with wrong capitalisation, they explain why standard alphanumeric codes
have much higher error rates than ones using simpler character sets. Moreover,
when compared to language-like codes, they are much slower to enter, more than
offsetting their increased security per character.
Although codes with simple syllabic patterns had better performance on all
fronts, care has to be taken to prevent phonetic errors, and to avoid disad-
vantaging certain cultures in which some syllabic patterns are absent. This is
especially important for codes used by diverse groups and in critical activities
such as voting.
As a large majority of errors could be prevented by a simple pattern, a single
length, and unambiguous characters, we propose a protocol, CVC6 , that is
easier and faster to transcribe, with fewer mistakes and increased security. We
also introduce CVC6++ , an extension that includes error detection/correction.
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Such codes could have wide-ranging applications, from voting technology to more
accessible routers.
Finally, the memorability of codes was shown to depend strongly on pattern
and length, albeit not in a trivial way. Subjects had a 75% chance of recognising
a code they had seen 2 to 5 minutes earlier but correctly rejected a code they
hadn’t seen in 87% of cases.
We are hopeful that the increased reliability and usability of code-creation
methods described here, together with new evaluation metrics for usable security
[10], can help users create much more effective passwords and other codes, for
improved security and usability.
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9.1 Future work
This study raises new questions on transcribing ability and code structure. In-
teresting follow-up experiments could be motivated by the following questions:
– Fonts have been shown to strongly impact reading ability [4]. What is the
impact of font, spacing, and case on codes?
– Is there a cost associated with not typing spaces? Is the speed increase
for chunking hampered by having to enter an extra space character? Why
doesn’t it increase transcribing ability? How would chunked input zones af-
fect it?
– Other surface features also have important effects on memory and language
learning [28]. How would the colour and texture coding of chunks affect
transcribing ability?
– Different syllabic patterns, such as CCVC or CVCC, have higher entropy,
but are less frequent and even absent in certain languages [2, 23, 6]. Could
they constitute viable alternatives to CVC and would they be less language-
dependent? Even further, could chunks made of real words be used, and
would they be worth the entropy loss for English speakers?
– Some letters (like q or x) being less frequent in many languages, would
transcribing ability increase with an even smaller alphabet? Could this com-
pensate the entropy loss?
– The memory performance measured purposefully avoided tricky codes that
were close to ones the subject had seen. What makes codes distinguishable?
For goals of privacy, can easily transcribable but not memorable codes be
formulated?
– The different error patterns shown are quite predictable, and could poten-
tially be used for a CAPTCHA system where the error would be human.
Could one game such a system?
– What is the impact of differences in typing ability among people who are used
to a different alphabet (such as Ge’ez, Hiragana, or Cyrillic), non-alphabetic
languages (Mandarin Chinese) or right-to-left writing systems?
This work also shows that new metrics might be needed to correctly analyse
the benefits of code structure, depending on the application. Such metrics would
need to include memorability, error probability and effect in case of error, typing
speed, perceived ease, and cultural dependency.
The authors would like to thank Florentin Waligorski for his help with data
analysis.
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